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Purpose: Assessing the reaction of the prices of shares of companies listed in the Warsaw 
Stock Exchange to the public disclosure of information about the filing a bankruptcy petition 
in bad faith by creditors. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: Event study analysis. 
Findings: It can therefore be assumed that the filing of an unfounded bankruptcy petition 
does not, in the short term, have a statistically significant negative impact on the share price 
of the company being the subject of the petition 
Practical Implications: When information about the filing a bankruptcy, petition appears 
and creditors submitted it in bad faith, it has not a negative impact on the share price in 
short term. It can be said that submitting such information is not an opportunity for an 
investor to receive an abnormal rate of return. 
Originality/value: Although there are many research results using event study analysis most 
of them are related to the US market. The originality of this paper is that this research is 
dedicated to petitions in bad faith for a selected developing country. 
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 Short-term Price Reaction to Involuntary Bankruptcies Filed in Bad Faith:  




One of the breakthroughs in financial theory was the development of the efficient 
market hypothesis and the concept of adjusting prices to emerging information. Its 
origins should be sought in the random walk theory proposed by Bachelier (1900), 
while the formal assumptions were presented in the 1960s by Samuelson (Delcey, 
2019) and Fama (1965a; 1965b; 1970), who was awarded the Nobel Prize in 2013. 
Over time, this theory has been criticised many times, and more and more 
researchers have presented results that undermine it. To this day there are disputes 
between researchers about the validity of this hypothesis. For example, a 
conversation between Fama and Thaler (2016) on the verifiability of the hypothesis 
of market efficiency in practice went down in history. There have been many studies 
on deviations from the mainstream theories. One of the key areas of growing interest 
is behavioural finance, which examines, among others, all kinds of anomalies in the 
capital market, constituting the foundations of numerous investment strategies.  
 
Also, psychology has become increasingly important in the study of investment 
behaviour. The precursors of this type of research include Dreman (1982), Howe 
(1986), De Bondt (2000) and Thaler (2016), who deal with the theory of price 
overreaction and underreaction to news. It shows that prices react too intensively 
(overreaction) or only slightly (underreaction) to certain information (De Bondt and 
Thaler, 1985), which is due to psychological factors (Dreman and Lufkin, 2000). 
The effect of the reaction of share prices and the level of their volatility to emerging 
information was often examined using the method of event analysis both in the short 
and in the long term (Kothari and Warner, 2007). The assessment was made of the 
impact of both positive or negative announcements and untrue information, 
including: fake news (Clarke et al., 2019), publication of stock market 
recommendations (Liu et al., 1990), information on mergers (Rosen, 2006; Keown 
and Pinkerton, 1981), earnings (De Bondt, 2000), stock splits (Gulen and Hwang, 
2012), dividends (Michaely et al., 1995), corporate strategy, customers and partners, 
products and services, management changes, legal developments (Neuhierl et al., 
2013), unexpected deaths of senior corporate executives (Johnson et al., 1985), 
corporate governance news (Brogi and Lagasio, 2018) or news about the R&D 
process (Perez-Rodriguez and Valcarcel, 2012).  
 
In addition to the above, the reaction of share prices to information on the 
functioning of companies at risk of bankruptcy or filing petitions for bankruptcy or 
rehabilitation proceedings was also analysed. Bonnier and Bruner (1989) achieved 
results which show that the communication of information about the change of 
management in distressed companies generates short-term positive price changes. 
Clark and Weinstein (1983) and Schatzberg and Reiber (1992) noted the short-term 
stock price reversal after the notification of the submission of the petition for 
rehabilitation proceedings under US Chapter 11, i.e., after significant price decreases 
during the petition submission period, an abnormal return rate was observed. A 
similar effect was achieved by Datta and Iskander-Datta (1995) and Dawkins et al. 
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(2007). Apart from the psychological factors described in the price overreaction and 
underreaction theory, the fact that insiders sell stock before prices fall and buy stock 
after prices have fallen may also explain this effect (Seyhun and Bradley 1997).  
 
However, confirming this effect would require in-depth research. Coelho and Taffler 
(2009a) were studying the long-term effect of applying for Chapter 11 procedure. It 
turned out that after 12 months the average abnormal return rate was 28%. The 
authors also verified how the rates of return behave because of the provision of 
information on the initiation of rehabilitation proceedings under Chapter 11 for 
strategic and non-strategic reasons. No significant differences were found between 
the period of filing the petition and the preceding one.  
 
On the other hand, companies filing petitions for strategic reasons achieved much 
higher rates of return within a few months after filing such a petition (Coelho, 
Taffler, 2009b). Rose-Green and Dawkins (2000) proved that, at the time of the 
submission of the petitions, the prices of the companies in which bankruptcy 
proceedings were initiated were falling more sharply than those in which the 
rehabilitation proceedings were commenced. In addition, Chen and Church (1996) 
concluded that companies which received going concern opinions achieved at the 
moment of notifying the public of the bankruptcy petition less negative rates of 
return than companies which did not have such opinions. One of the few studies 
conducted in a market outside the USA concerned Malaysia. It showed that the 
notification about the bankruptcy of a company generates a negative abnormal return 
in the short term. What is more, re-emerged firms experience significantly less 
negative abnormal returns compared to delisted firms (Ahmad et al., 2016).  
 
Most of the above studies were carried out based on data from the USA and none of 
them concerned the analysis of the reaction of prices to emerging information on a 
bankruptcy filing by creditors in bad faith. This is the purpose of this study and, 
according to the authors’ knowledge, it is the first such study that has been 
conducted so far. In this connection, the following research question is proposed: do 
share prices react in the short term to emerging information that creditors have filed 
for bankruptcy in bad faith? The analysis was made based on data obtained from the 
Polish capital market, which is still perceived by many institutions as an emerging 
one. Poland is still regarded by many organisations to be an emerging market, 
although FTSE Russell, for example, reclassified it in 2018 to developed markets. 
Information on filing a bankruptcy petition in bad faith was obtained from current 
reports published by the companies in the period 6 December 2004 – 31 December 
2019. The event analysis was adopted as the research method.  
 
The article is structured as follows. Apart from the introduction, the second part of 
the study presents issues concerning the concept, types, effects, and legal regulations 
of bankruptcy initiated in bad faith, with particular emphasis on the situation in 
Poland. The third section presents the research methodology, together with a 
description of the sample selection and the research method used. The next section 
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contains the results and the final one provides conclusions of the analysis carried 
out. 
 
2. Bankruptcy Petitions Filed in Bad Faith — Literature Review 
 
In most countries, bankruptcy petitions can be made by debtors or creditors — the 
former are generally obliged to initiate bankruptcy proceedings if there are certain 
reasons, such as lack of liquidity or insufficient assets to cover all liabilities 
(according to the so-called balance sheet test). Petitions submitted in bad faith are 
characterized by the fact that the prerequisites for bankruptcy or rehabilitation 
proceedings are not met, and most often the applicant aims to achieve benefits at the 
expense of another group of stakeholders. The literature on the subject does not 
devote much attention to this issue, and most of the legal publications on these 
problems refer to the United States (Ponoroff, Knippenberg, 1991; Ponoroff, 1992; 
Godshall and Gilhuly, 1998). Petitions of this kind may be filed by both debtors and 
creditors.  
 
In the USA, numerous petitions were filed by solvent organisations that generated 
positive cash flows. Bankruptcy or rehabilitation proceedings were conducted in 
order to address specific problems, e.g. to limit the impact of potential penalties 
(asbestos companies; archdioceses in which priests committed sexual abuse); to 
reduce labour costs (steel producers who promised their employees high retirement 
severances in exchange for lower wages; Continental Airlines Corporation, the main 
motive of which was to terminate the collective agreement) (Skeel Jr., 2003; 
Ponoroff and Knippenberg, 1991). In theory, some of such cases are often referred to 
as “strategic insolvencies” (Delaney, 1998). In this article the second type of 
petitions, i.e., involuntary bankruptcies filed in bad faith, are examined.  
 
In the United States, the analysis of these petitions from a legal point of view was 
carried out by, among others, Shachmurove (2018) and Webster (2019), while in 
Poland the subject was dealt with by Piłat and Miłaszewski (2019). Such petitions 
are filed by creditors, either for their intended benefit or, less frequently, for the 
benefit of other stakeholders. The main reason for such petitions in the case of 
creditors is to persuade the debtor to settle its obligations towards them. The costs of 
initiating bankruptcy proceedings are much lower than the expenses necessary to 
initiate civil proceedings and then carry out the bailiff’s enforcement.  
 
In addition, these petitions are also filed when there is a disputed claim, and the 
creditor wants to put pressure on the debtor to settle it. Another reason may be a 
reduction in the debtor’s competitiveness in relation to companies operating in the 
same industry that benefit from this situation. In extreme cases, such action aims at 
lowering the market prices of listed companies to acquire them. Finally, it happens 
that creditors only want to harm the debtor for personal reasons. The effects of such 
an action may be varied. The mere filing of a petition for bankruptcy and the 
publication of such information puts the debtor in an unfavourable light, causing a 
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deterioration of its image and market position, as well as a drop in share prices. 
Crediting banks often use clauses entitling them to terminate the loan agreement in 
such a situation, withdraw from further financing and demand immediate loan 
repayment. It becomes practically impossible or difficult to raise capital on the 
market. Suppliers withdraw or demand cash payments, and the best employees are 
looking for new jobs. In some entities, the probability of inspecting the debtor 
company by the supervisory authorities also increases (Piłat and Miłaszewski, 2019).  
 
With a view to protecting debtors against this type of action, many legislations have 
introduced provisions on sanctions against creditors that file for bankruptcy in bad 
faith. For example, in Poland, Article 34 of the Bankruptcy Law (2003) states: “if a 
creditor submits a petition in bad faith, the court, rejecting the petition for 
bankruptcy, shall charge the creditor with the costs of the proceedings and may order 
the creditor to make a public statement of the relevant content and form. If the 
creditor’s petition for bankruptcy filed in bad faith is rejected, the debtor, as well as 
a third party, shall be entitled to a claim for damages against the creditor”. While 
these provisions are definitely necessary, it should be borne in mind that damage 
often occurs immediately after a petition in bad faith is made public, while obtaining 
general damages can take a long time and require the collection of appropriate 
evidence.  
 
Creditors acting in bad faith often take these factors into account when analysing 
potential costs and benefits. It is also essential that the managers of a debtor’s 
company react quickly and inform the public that the bankruptcy petition is not 
justified considering the financial situation of their entity. What is more, it is 
important to conduct conversations with key stakeholders and explain to them that 
there are no grounds for declaring bankruptcy and that the petition was made in bad 
faith. 
 
3. Methodology  
 
The main research objective is to analyse the reaction of share prices and, at the 
same time, return rates to the public disclosure of information about the filing of a 
petition for bankruptcy by creditors in bad faith. Current reports were taken into 
account, in which the board of directors, at the time of the announcement of filing 
the petition for the bankruptcy of the company by the creditors also informed the 
public that, in its opinion, there are no grounds for declaring bankruptcy and the 
petition is unfounded. The authors assume that if the market is informationally 
efficient, such a message should not generate above-average negative returns.  
 
The selection of observations for the sample was carried out in the way described 
below. First, all current reports from the ESPI (Electronic System for Information 
Transmission) system submitted by companies listed in the Polish stock market in 
the period 6 December 2004 – 31 December 2019 and available at 
http://biznes.pap.pl/pl/reports/espi/company/82,2018,0,0,1 were analysed. Out of 
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367,365 reports, those relating to petitions for bankruptcy filed in bad faith were 
selected. Observations that revealed relevant disruptive information during the 
analysis period were removed. For example, Polimex-Mostostal was not considered, 
as its creditors repeatedly filed petitions which were either later withdrawn by them 
or dismissed by the court. Finally, 10 companies were selected for the sample. 
Although it is a relatively small number, this sample considers all the cases observed 
during the period considered. At the time of submitting the information on filing the 
bankruptcy petition, the boards of directors of all the companies indicated that it was 
unfounded. The data related to the test sample and potential disruptive information 
during the analysis period (0; +5 > session days are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. The data related to the test sample 
Company 
Date and time of 
publication of the 
report on filing a 
petition for bankruptcy 




day of the 
event 
Relevant information from ESPI in the window 









Revocation of the bankruptcy petition by the 
creditor. 
22.07.2015, 13:15 
Conclusion of a significant contract by the 
issuer’s subsidiary. 




Submission of the consolidated quarterly report. 
28.02.2013, 13.23 and 15.44 
Providing information on the signing of 




























Board of directors’ statement confirming that: 
- Komputronik SA duly performs all its maturing 
monetary obligations; 
- the Issuer is not aware of any circumstances on 
the basis of which anyone or any legal person 
would have the right to file a bankruptcy 
petition. 
20.09.2011, 17.29 
The court fully agreed with the issuer’s 
argumentation and dismissed the claim of the 








MIRBUD SA 9.03.2016, 17.41 
10.03.20
16 
10.03.2016, 07:00, 12:17 
Signing a letter of intent to carry out construction 
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work. 
The company’s offer was assessed as the most 
advantageous among the offers for the 








Dismissal of the petition for bankruptcy by the 
court. 




The analysis of the petition confirms that the 
Company has no civil law obligations towards 
the applicant, as well as that the petition is 
unfounded and was submitted in bad faith. 
09.09.2015, 20:03 
Winning the tender for the extension of the Sofia 
subway. 
Source: Own work based on current reports available at 
http://biznes.pap.pl/pl/reports/espi/current,2004,0,0,1. 
 
Additionally, it was assumed that publishing the information at 4.55 p.m. or later 
meant that the day of the event was the next session day (this meant postponement to 
the next day, and for Interbud-Lublin SA and Newag SA by three days, as in the 
case of these companies the information was published on Friday after 4.55 p.m.). 
The information about the assumed date of the event is also included in Table 1. 
This assumption results from the fact that investors did not have time to react on the 
day of publication of the event and their orders were considered already on the next 
trading day. The date of the event is identical to the date of publication of 
information for three companies: Instal Kraków SA, J.W. Construction Holding SA 
and Komputronik SA. In the case of these companies, the information appeared at 
such a time that investors had at least two hours to react and carry out transactions 
related to their shares. 
 
The research method adopted in the paper is the analysis of events described in the 
works of Gurgul (2019) and Sorescu et al. (2017). All calculations were made on the 
basis of daily closing prices, based on which the logarithmic rates of return used in 
the analysis were calculated. Data on the daily closing prices were obtained from 
http://infostrefa.com. The event analysis was carried out in the R software 
environment, using the “EventStudy” package by Schimmer et al. (2015). Abnormal 
returns (AR) were calculated using a market model in which the explanatory 
variable was the logarithmic rates of return from the main index of the Warsaw 
Stock Exchange, WIG. The following model was estimated for each of the ten 
analysed companies: 
 
       (1) 
where: 
Ri,t – the rate of return for company “i” on day “t”, 
Rm,t – the rate of return for the WIG index on day “t”, 
i,t – the random component, 
αi, βi – the estimated market-based model parameters. 
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Hence, the value of the AR rate in the test window was finally determined as: 
 
        (2) 
 
In order to determine the parameters of the above model, it was assumed that the 
length of the estimation window is 120 observations and that the latest of the 
observations considered is done seven days before the event. Such a length of the 
estimation window results, on the one hand, from the fact that the period is long 
enough to allow for determining the relationship between the company in question 
and the wider market in a reliable way, while on the other hand, from the fact that 
the risk-free rate of return, i.e. the αi parameter, can be assumed to be constant over 
this period. The test window was set, in turn, as lasting from 2nd day before the 
event until the 5th day following it. 
 
In addition to AR, the analysis also used the AAR, CAR and CAAR rates. The rates 
tested were calculated according to the formulas in Schimmer et al. (2015). 
 
         (3) 
        (4) 
       (5) 
 
where: 
AAR - average abnormal return, 
N - number of events in the analysed group (in the conducted study N=10), 
CAR - cumulative abnormal return, 
t1 – start of the test window (in the performed analysis: two days before the event), 
t2 – end of the test window (in the conducted analysis: five days after the event), 
CAAR – cumulative average abnormal return. 
 
The analysis was conducted in two ways, for each company individually (using the 
AR and CAR rates) and for the analysed group of ten companies (using the AAR 
and CAAR rates). The tests used in the analysis, together with an indication of the 




The tables below present the results of the conducted analyses. For all the results 
obtained by means of statistical tests, the same form of marking was adopted. If the 
significance level of the results obtained was less than or equal to α=0.01, such 
results are marked as “***”. Levels of significance less than or equal to α=0.05 and 
α=0.1 are marked with “**” and “*”, respectively. Table 3 shows the results of the 
above-average rates of return obtained and the corresponding values of the T-test 
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statistics, which are written in parentheses. Additionally, if the test result was 
statistically significant, it was marked as shown above. Importantly, the standard 
deviation from the estimation window was used to calculate the test statistic. 
 
Table 2. Statistical tests used in the analysis broken down by the rates of return used 
Rates used Statistical tests Source for the test 
AR, CAR 1. T-test 1. Gurgul (2019) 
AAR, CAAR 
1. Patell or Standardized Residual Test 
(Patell Z) 
2. Kolari and Pynnönen adjusted 
Patell or Standardized Residual Test (Adj. 
Patell Z) 
3. Adjusted Standardized Cross-Section Test 
(Adj. StdCSect Z) 
4. Corrado rank test (Rank Z) 
5. Generalized rank Z Test (Gen. rank Z) 
6. Generalized rank T Test (Gen. rank T). 
1. Patell (1976) 
2 and 3. Kolari and 
Pynnönen (2010) 
4. Corrado and Zivney, 
(1992) 
5 and 6. Kolari and 
Pynnönen (2011). 
 
Note: The parametric tests are in bold. The abbreviated name of the test is given in brackets 
— it is used in the further part of the paper. 
Source: Own work on the basis of https://www.eventstudytools.com. 
 




AR(-2) AR(-1) AR(0) AR(1) AR(2) AR(3) AR(4) AR(5) 






































































































































































































Source: Own work. 
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On the basis of the data presented in Table 3, it can be concluded that for six out of 
the ten companies analysed, not statistically significant above-average rates of return 
occurred at the date of the event. Therefore, the announcement of a bankruptcy 
petition filed in bad faith did not result in a sudden sale (or purchase) of shares in 
these companies. Moreover, out of these six companies, positive rates of return were 
observed for four of them on that day and negative rates of return were observed for 
two of them. However, in the case of three companies: Instal Kraków SA, Interbud-
Lublin SA and Komputronik SA statistically significant above-average negative 
rates of return were recorded on the day of the event. It can therefore be concluded 
that filing a petition for bankruptcy in bad faith resulted in a sale of shares in these 
companies, which led to the fall of their prices.  
 
What is important, just one day after the event, the share prices of Instal Kraków SA 
and Interbud-Lublin SA increased (although not significantly compared to the 
market), and in the case of Komputronik SA there was a minimal repeated price 
drop of 0.2%. Interestingly, on that day Komputronik SA was the only company 
among the three discussed to issue an announcement that the petition was 
unjustified. While it is true that the date of publication of this communication could 
have had a positive impact on the price on the day following the event, such an 
effect has not been confirmed in the light of the performed analysis — on the 
contrary, in the context of increases in the case of the remaining two companies, it 
seems that the publication of such a communication did not result in a price increase 
on the day following the event, which could be the subject of further analyses as the 
number of observations increases.  
 
One day after the event, only for one company, JW Construction Holding SA, a 
statistically significant and negative above-average rate of return was recorded. 
However, it cannot be said with certainty that this above-average fall in prices was 
linked to the announcement of a filing a petition for bankruptcy in bad faith. In the 
case of this company, there was a 5.5% increase in the return rate on the day of the 
event, even though investors had more than 2 hours to react to the published 
information. The price decrease can therefore be linked to previous increases, which 
certainly had an impact on the adjustment of the rate of return on the day following 
the event. The case of Erbud SA is also interesting in terms of the situation on day 
following the event. In the case of this company, strong increases were recorded on 
the following day, which should be related to the published consolidated report. In 
addition, on the second day following the event, the company announced the signing 
of significant contracts, which also resulted in above-average positive rates of return 
against a broad market. 
 
On the following days, a total of six above-average positive returns and three above-
average negative returns were recorded. As a result, in the case of the analysed 
companies it cannot be concluded that a statistically significant and negative impact 
of the published information existed — on the contrary, there is a predominance of 
statistically significant positive interest rates for the analysed stocks. 
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The results presented above, with no statistically significant impact on the share 
prices of companies for which bankruptcy applications were filed in bad faith, were 
also confirmed within the tested group. The results of this analysis, based on the 
AAR rate, are presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Results of statistical tests, based on AAR rates, for the analysed group of 
companies 
 AAR(-2) AAR(-1) AAR(0) AAR(1) AAR(2) AAR(3) AAR(4) AAR(5) 
AAR 0.1% 1.1% -1.2% 1.0% 1.5% -1.2% 2.1% -0.1% 
Pos AR : Neg 
AR 04:06 05:05 05:05 05:05 05:05 02:08 07:03 04:06 




































Source: Own work. 
 
Table 4 shows in the row marked “AAR” the mean above-average rate of return on 
the subsequent days of analysis for the sample tested. The next line presents the 
number of positive and negative rates of return constituting the basis for AAR values 
calculation. The following lines show the results of six statistical tests which were 
used to assess the occurrence of above-average rates of return. The presented results 
are the basis for the statement that there is not statistically significant (at least at the 
level of α=0.05) negative impact of publishing information about a petition for 
bankruptcy filed in bad faith. None of the tests carried out shows such regularity. 
Statistical significance of α=0.1 was observed only for the two tests carried out, but 
it should be noted that this is the lowest significance level, and these results were 
obtained in the parametric tests with the lowest statistical power.  
 
Therefore, this cannot be a reason to conclude that the publication of information 
about the petition has a negative impact on the share price of these companies, at a 
level of significance equal to at least α=0.05. What is more, it can be stated that the 
market evaluates the companies from the test sample in an efficient manner, as 
petitions filed in bad faith do not affect the prices of these shares in a statistically 
significant way. However, high volatility of interest rates was observed for the 
analysed group of companies and the highest increase was recorded on the fourth 
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Number of day before or after event
 
Source: Own work. 
 
In practice, on almost all of the subsequent days under consideration, the sign of the 
average interest rate was reversed, as shown in Figure 1. The standard deviation of 
the interest rate on these days is three times higher than the average interest rate 
recorded in the same period.  
 
In the next step, it was determined whether the publication of the analysed 
information had a negative impact on the rates of return cumulated in the test 
window (i.e. from -2 to +5). The results for each company are shown in Table 5. 
 




















KOMPUTRONIK SA 3.3% 0.541 
MDI ENERGIA SA 5.3% 0.718 
MIRBUD SA -1.9% -0.182 
MOSTOSTAL ZABRZE SA -0.7% -0.057 
NEWAG SA 5.2% 1.086 
Source: Own work. 
 
On the basis of the data in Table 5 in can be stated that no above average and 
statistically significant negative cumulative interest rates have been confirmed for 
any of the companies. Surprisingly, for two companies — Erbud SA and Instal 
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Kraków SA — a cumulative, statistically significant (for α=0.05) and positive 
above-average rate of return was observed. Therefore, also in the case of cumulative 
interest rates it cannot be concluded that there is a negative effect of the published 
information on these companies during a period of one week covering the period 
from -2 to +5 days from the event in question. A joined assessment of the 
cumulative interest rate for the analysed group of companies was also made and the 
results of this analysis are presented in Table 6.  
 
Table 6. Results of statistical tests, based on the CAAR rate, for the analysed group 
of companies 
Test CAAR (-2,5) 
CAAR Value 3.3% 
pos CAR : neg CAR 06:04 
Patell Z 1.837(*) 
Adj. Patell Z 1.8317(*) 
Adj. StdCSect Z 2.0324 (**) 
Rank Z 1.1989 
Gen. Rank Z 1.8259(*) 
Gen. Rank T 1.865(*) 
Source: Own work. 
 
While previous analyses carried out on the basis of AR, AAR and CAR rates did not 
confirm the existence of a statistically significant and negative above-average 
interest rate as a result of filing a petition for bankruptcy in bad faith (on the 
contrary, they showed a lack of response from investors to such information, which 
emphasizes market efficiency and the rational, rather than emotional, approach of 
investors), the results obtained with the CAAR rate can be considered surprising 
against this background.  
 
In the test window (-2, +5), on average, all companies obtained a positive 
cumulative rate of return. In addition, five out of six tests showed a statistically 
significant and positive above-average cumulative rate of return. Although four of 
these tests are only significant for α=0.1 and the last one for α=0.05, the mere fact 
that there is a positive above-average cumulative rate of return is somewhat 
surprising. Such a result, in which the CAAR is positive, should be linked to the fact 
that the analysed companies revealed positive information after the event in 
question.  
 
Out of the sample of ten analysed companies, such positive distorting events were 
recorded in the case of six companies. It should also be noted that these positive 
disruptive events in most cases weren’t known on the day of the event. The boards 
of companies in the case of which an unfounded bankruptcy petition has been filed 
tried to additionally demonstrate, in the following days, that such petition had no 
basis and therefore made every effort to publish positive information after the event 
in question, which translated into the results for the CAAR rate presented above. 
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The research has shown that it happens that individual companies obtain above-
average, negative and statistically significant rates of return on the date of 
publication of information about filing a bankruptcy petition in bad faith, but there 
are few of them and on the following day they usually make up for losses. The 
absence of a negative and statistically significant above-average rate of return is also 
evidenced by the results of the tests carried out for the examined sample of 
companies. None of the tests was statistically significant at least at α=0.05 on the 
day of the event or on any other day thereafter. Characteristically, there was also a 
high variability for AAR rate on the examined days.  
 
Considering the cumulative rates of return obtained for individual companies, it can 
be said that the research also failed to confirm above-average negative interest rates 
in the test window. On the contrary, there were two companies for which the above-
average cumulative rates of return were positive. However, when analysing the 
cumulative rate of return for the test sample, a statistically weakly significant value 
of above-average positive rates of return was found.  
 
The above-mentioned conclusions from various variants of the conducted research 
confirm the hypothesis of market efficiency and the absence of irrational decisions 
on the part of investors who hold shares in companies in the case of which 
bankruptcy petitions have been filed in bad faith. As a result of the conducted 
research it can therefore be assumed that the filing of an unfounded bankruptcy 
petition does not, in the short term, have a statistically significant negative impact on 
the share price of the company being the subject of the petition. It should be noted, 
however, that in each case the boards of directors reacted promptly to the filing of 
the bankruptcy petition and immediately issued a declaration that it was unfounded. 
This could have had a significant impact on investors’ reactions. Moreover, a 
statistically weak but positive effect on the group of surveyed companies in the case 
of a cumulative rate of return was noted. It may be a consequence of the appearance 
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